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ABSTRACT 
A new approach to detect suspicious, unknown event 
patterns in the field of fraud detection by using a combi-
nation of discriminant analysis and neural network tech-
niques is presented. The approach is embedded in a 
Complex Event Processing (CEP) engine. CEP is an 
emerging technology for detecting known patterns of 
events and aggregating them as complex events at a 
higher level of analysis in real-time. Detection systems 
can be differentiated in rule based systems and those 
based on statistical methods. In order to reach the goal of 
finding unknown fraud patterns, several statistical meth-
ods are discussed. On this background, first experimental 
results of our approach as a combination of CEP, dis-
criminant analysis and neural networks are presented.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
I.5.2 [Pattern Recognition]: Design Methodology – 
Pattern analysis; H.4.2 [Information Systems Applica-
tions]: Types of Systems – Decision support (e.g., MIS) 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Experimentation, Security  
Keywords 
Complex Event Processing, Discriminant Analysis, Neu-
ral Networks, Fraud Detection, Event Patterns 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the global event cloud of an organization many kinds 
of events occur. According to [2, 3, p. 88] an event is a 
record of an activity in a system and may be related to 
other events. By the use of CEP-engines, low-level events 
can be aggregated to high level events in real time. This 
can be achieved with known event patterns. Known 
events can be derived heuristically. Event patterns are 
implemented using event pattern languages (EPL) and 
event processing languages, see [3, p. 116-126]. In con-
trast to known event patterns, unknown event patterns can 
not be derived from heuristics based on an existing busi-
ness process. They did not exist in the past or have not 
been recognized so far. An unknown pattern could be 
found with the help of event processing agents by analyz-
ing the event cloud of an organisation and using specific 
algorithms to detect it, as described in chapter 2. 
2.  DETECTING UNKNOWN EVENT 
PATTERNS BY COMBINING DIS-
CRIMINANT ANALYSIS AND NEU-
RAL NETWORKS 
The new fraud detection approach consists of a combina-
tion of discriminant analysis (see [4]) and neural net-
works (see [5]). This has the advantage, that every event 
represents one value as input for a neural network. The 
whole process is represented in fig. 1 and described 
below. The CEP engine creates event clusters on the base 
of known historical fraud events and no-fraud events. The 
total number of the clusters depends on how fine the 
event groups or clusters should be subdivided. The allo-
cation of an event into a specific cluster depends on event 
attributes which are relevant for classifying an event as 
fraud or no-fraud event. By using the values of these 
relevant attributes for calculating the discriminant coeffi-
cient, the discriminant functions will be computed. 
 
 
Figure 1: System architecture of combined discrimi-
nant analysis and neural network approach 
 
The discriminant functions are used for allocating a new 
occurring event into a specific group of events. This is 
reached by inserting the relevant attribute values of a new 
occurring event in the discriminant function and compar-
ing the computed value with the critical discriminant 
value base on the historic event clusters. This allocation 
process is defined exactly in [7]. The discriminant func-
tions will be updated on the base of new discriminant 
group allocations after a defined time interval. So the 
discriminant functions keep dynamic for changing event 
occurrences and situations. At the beginning of the proc-
ess, the global event cloud of an organization is scanned 
by a CEP engine. The events will be classified by insert-
ing the relevant attributes in the discriminant functions 
and on the base of the results (discriminant value) they 
will be allocated into a specific discriminant group. On 
the one hand, an event can be allocated exactly to one 
specific discriminant group or on the other hand it can be 
a part of two or more discriminant groups. In that case, 
the discriminant value can be multiplied with a factor that 
represents the degree of membership to the discriminant 
group. This part of the process is described in [7]. For 
every discriminant group defined, a specific neural net-
work is generated. The weights of the networks are de-
termined by training them with discriminant values from 
known fraud and no-fraud event patterns of their specific 
discriminant group. So the discriminant values are used 
as input values for the neural networks. One discriminant 
value represents one event of a pattern that should be 
identified as fraud or no-fraud by the neural network. 
After running the neural network for an occurring combi-
nation of event discriminant values, the output value will 
be evaluated in order to find out whether the input events 
are a fraud combination or not. For known fraud combi-
nations, the networks are trained with 1 as output value 
whereas known no-fraud combinations are trained with 0. 
In order to identify unknown combinations, a threshold is 
determined on the base of the training results e.g. 0.5. If 
the output value of an unknown input combination of 
events (respectively discriminant values) is greater than 
the threshold the system classifies it as fraud and reacts 
with a predefined action e.g. sending an alert to an opera-
tor. The values of a detected fraud pattern will be inserted 
in the training set which is used to train the network 
again, e.g. after the expiration of a predefined time inter-
val just as one hour or one day. The frequency of the 
training processes depends on the performance of the 
detection system. If this process is leading to a decrease 
of the system performance, it can be regulated e.g. by 
running grid computing techniques [1]. The architecture 
described extends the work described in [7], because [7] 
defines the events inside a specific discriminant group as 
unknown pattern itself if the discriminant groups are 
defined exactly enough. In addition, the new approach 
uses neural networks for evaluating the occurring combi-
nations of events allocated to a specific discriminant 
group of being an unknown fraud pattern or not. 
3. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The experimental environment is programmed in java by 
using Eclipse 3.2 as development tool. The java classes 
including the codes of the discriminant analysis algorithm 
and the neural network are embedded in StreamBase 
Studio [6] via a .jar file. This .jar file is connected with 
the java-operator component “FraudDetectionOperator. 
The event cloud is read into the java operator by 
EventInputAdpater and the results are written to a text 
file by using OutputFileAdapter. The parameters of the 
experiments are the following: 
 
• Event cloud: 16 events (8 fraud and 8 no fraud 
events) 
• Event-attributes: 2 fraud relevant attributes,      
3 no-fraud relevant attributes 
• Neural network initial weights :  
-input node 1 to hidden node 1:  -10.663 
-input node 1 to hidden node 2:  -5.280 
-input node 2 to hidden node 1:  -5.628 
-input node 2 to hidden node 2:  -2.589 
-hidden node 1 to output node :  -14.496 
-hidden node 2 to output node :  -6.416 
 
After running the discriminant analysis as well as back-
propagation learning with the event cloud and the test 
events, the algorithm delivers the following results:  
 
• Disc. function: -0,0079 * x1 +  0,0101 * x2 
• Critical discriminant value: 0.404 
• Backpropagation loops: 20.000 
• Learning factor: 0.9 
• Neural network initial weights :  
-input node 1 to hidden node 1:  -34.025 
-input node 1 to hidden node 2:   19.685 
-input node 2 to hidden node 1:   18.563 
-input node 2 to hidden node 2:  -29.721 
-hidden node 1 to output node :  -19.913 
-hidden node 2 to output node :  -24.085 
 
According to these experimental results, a fraud-dividing 
threshold of 0.4 can be determined for the created neural 
network. So if the activation value of the output node is 
greater than 0.4, the investigated known or unknown 
event pattern can be classified as fraud pattern. In this 
case, the application reacts with a predefined action e.g. 
sending an alert to the responsible operator. But this 
threshold of 0.4 can be adapted when the network has 
learned enough new patterns.  
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
The work, presented in this paper, is still in progress. So 
by running these first experiments, the authors only want 
to show that the combination of discriminant analysis 
with neural networks is running successfully for a small 
set of events with two relevant attributes. In addition, the 
structure of the neural network only consists of two input 
nodes, two hidden nodes and one output node. Because of 
this simplified environment, the next steps are to extend 
the test and training data sets as well as the structure of 
the neural networks and the amount of historic events 
needed for creating the discriminant functions. The goal 
is to obtain research results about the new approach 
running in a more complex environment. In this context, 
it is also important to test the performance of the new 
approach in order to find out if it meets the requirements 
of real-time environments typical for CEP. A further step 
is to improve the experimental environment in such a 
way that it is able to simulate the structure of credit card 
transaction events and credit card frauds more exactly. 
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